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Question: Did Soviets have reason to believe we have known about Brigade for long time?

Answer : -- They clearly did not advertise it, but neither did they do all they could have done to conceal it -- e.g., landlines, or encyphered communications only.

-- If they thought US intelligence knew, they may have concluded USG chose not to object or did not wish to make issue of it.

-- Once they became aware of US concern (mid July 1979), they did not, however, curtail training activities and went ahead with substantial exercise mid August.

Question: If there is a Soviet brigade in Cuba, don't the Soviets ipso facto have a "base" there?

Answer : All depends on how one chooses to define a "base." Question best addressed to State Department. [Clearly Soviet troops are organized in brigade structure and their equipment stationed in Cuba. But power projection capability of a ground force unit located on an island is qualitatively different from an air or naval unit which may be stationed ("based") on an island.] -- Bracketed language is derived from State Department paper for Tuesday PRC meeting.

Question: How did story first get into press?

Answer : Resulted from Senator Stone question to Brown on 17 July at SFRC SALT hearing. Brown made statement which was cleared for public release. Vance discussed the issue in a letter to Stone dated 27 July responding to Stone's letter to the President.

9 September 1979

The Cuban Analytic Center

The Cuban Analytic Center was formally established in January 1978. Prior to the establishment of the Center, all economic analysis concerning Cuba was produced by the Office of Economic Research; all military analysis--both Soviet and Cuban--was produced by the Office of Strategic Research. The Center's original membership consisted of one economist, one biographics analyst, one military analyst, three political analysts, a research assistant, and the Center chief. In effect, the Center was expected to produce about 80 percent of NFAC's analytical output--current and research--on Cuban political, economic, and military developments. (S)

Analysts in the Office of Central Reference continued to maintain biographic files on Cuban personalities and to produce biographic reports on Cuban leaders. The Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research continues to produce analyses on selected Cuban subjects. The Office of Economic Research retains its responsibility for monitoring Soviet military shipments to Cuba and the Office of Strategic Research retains its responsibility for monitoring Soviet

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military activities in Cuba. Responsibility for technical matters such as the Lourdes SIGINT site is shared between the Office of Strategic Research and the Office of Weapons Intelligence. Despite this division of responsibility among several offices, there has been in practice very close cooperation and coordination among the various analysts following Cuba.

The mission of the Center was to produce an integrated analytical product that considered all relevant aspects--political, economic, and military--of the situation rather than individual pieces that focused only on one facet of the analytical problem. Priorities for the Center were set in accordance with the *National Intelligence Topics* (NITs) and in consultation with the NFAC leadership. The original agenda for the Center was concurred in by the Director of the National Intelligence Officers, the Director, National Foreign Assessment Center, the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Political Analysis, and the Office of Strategic Research. This agenda consisted of the following:

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9 Sept.

SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN CUBA

DCI:

We learned today that DD/NFA had decided not to put anything in tomorrow's PDB or NID. The task force will put together its recommendations on what should be in these pubs, and DD/NFA will make his recommendations to you tomorrow for possible Tuesday publications.

Possible PDB might be re-examination of imagery indicates that we have high confidence that the 2 installations (Santiago and Lourdes) have been occupied by Soviet military units since Nov '62 in Santiago; summer of '64 in Lourdes.

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LEFT SIDE

1. Talking Points
2. Chronology of Soviet Comm. Network in Cuba.
3. CIA reported brigade on 3 Aug '78-activity since that reporting
4. Documentation of Significant Mil. Reporting on Cuba
5. Documentation of NPIC Reporting
6. Current activity:
 - NPIC
 - OIA Analytical
 - Recommended enhanced collection
7. Historical aspects of "Cuban Analytical Center"

RIGHT SIDE

1. Q&A material on Oberdorfer article in Post
2. Vance talking points.
3. Summary Extracts of 12 more significant DDO reports related to Soviet "brigade" (others being reviewed)
4. DDO reports used in Summary Extracts

Which Senators argued for more
resources for us?

Baker?

Glenn

Adams?

yes

A205

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AM-CIA SKED 9-9

ADV 630PM EDT

BY ROBERT MACKAY

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN THE LAST 15 YEARS HAS DAMAGED U.S. SECURITY BY GROSSLY UNDERESTIMATING SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH AND INTENTIONS; TWO FORMER DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS SAID SUNDAY.

THE CIA'S BIGGEST MISTAKE DURING THAT TIME WAS UNDERESTIMATING THE SOVIET UNION'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND ITS OVERALL MILITARY EFFORT; SAID ROBERT ELLSWORTH AND KENNETH L. ADELMAN IN THE FALL ISSUE OF FOREIGN POLICY MAGAZINE.

IN ADDITION, THE CIA "ASSUMED THE THIRD WORLD LACKS THE WIT AND WHEREWITHAL TO INFLUENCE DECISIVELY THE GREAT GAME OF WORLD POLITICS," THUS DISCOUNTING THE YOM KIPPUR WAR, THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO AND OIL PRICE HIKE AND THE REVOLUTION AGAINST THE SHAH OF IRAN; ELLSWORTH AND ADELMAN SAID.

ELLSWORTH, A FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, IS NOW AT THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY. ADELMAN, A FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, IS SENIOR POLITICAL SCIENTIST AT THE STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTER OF STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE INTERNATIONAL.

"BEGINNING IN THE 1960S, THE CIA EMBARKED UPON A CONSISTENT UNDERESTIMATION OF THE SOVIET ICBM BUILDUP, MISSING THE MARK BY WIDE MARGINS; ITS ESTIMATES BECAME PROGRESSIVELY WORSE, ON THE LOW SIDE," THE TWO MEN SAID.

"IN THE MID-1970S THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDERESTIMATED THE SCALE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SOVIETS' ... MIRV PROGRAMS. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, SOVIET WARHEAD ACCURACIES THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED -- AND THAT HAVE EQUALED U.S. ACCURACIES -- HAD BEEN ESTIMATED BY AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE TO BE UNATTAINABLE BY MOSCOW BEFORE THE MID-1980S.

"IN 1976, THE CIA SUDDENLY AND RETROACTIVELY DOUBLED THE PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IT FIGURED THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN AND WERE DEVOTING TO DEFENSE -- FROM BETWEEN 5 AND 7 PERCENT -- TO BETWEEN 11 AND 13 PERCENT. SUCH FLAWED CIA ESTIMATES HELPED FORM NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS."

ALSO, ELLSWORTH AND ADELMAN SAID U.S. INTELLIGENCE FAILED TO NOTE THAT NORTH KOREA HAD AMASSED THE FIFTH LARGEST GROUND ARMY IN THE WORLD AND THE U.S. NAVY WAS SHOCKED LAST MAY WHEN THE SOVIETS LAUNCHED A NUCLEAR-POWERED SUBMARINE "THAT STEAMS FASTER AND DIVES DEEPER THAN ANYTHING THE UNITED STATES HAS."

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THE TWO MEN SAID THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM LIES WITHIN THE CIA'S OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE, WHICH ASSUMES "THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE WINDING THEIR WAY TOWARD A MODICUM OF COOPERATION, IF NOT COLLABORATION." IN ORDER TO SUPPORT THIS VISION, THEY SAID, THE DIRECTORATE SCREENED OUT DATA THAT SUGGESTED OTHERWISE.

THE PRESENT U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM HAS LUMPED TOO MANY RESPONSIBILITIES INTO ONE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, FOSTERING A TYPE OF "GROUPTHINK," THE AUTHORS SAID. THEY SUGGESTED THAT CONGRESS SEPARATE THE TWO FUNCTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE CIA -- HEAD OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR BOTH BUDGET AND ESTIMATES AND OPERATING CHIEF OF THE CIA.

UPI 09-09 12:14 PED

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Q & As drawn from Oberdorfer Article (Washington Post, 9 Sept 79)

Q: When was first time NSA picked up a reference to a "brigade"?

A: 24 October 1975

Q: Why didn't the Intelligence Community react to this info?



Q: What prior information did we have about the Soviet garrison at Los Palacios?

A: We know of no Soviet garrison near Los Palacios.

Q: What was the "happy accident in early 1978" that produced the key photography referred to in the article?

A: There was no such breakthrough. It is possible Oberdorfer's source was referring to August 1978 photography that I displayed earlier which we now believe showed a Soviet exercise at San Pedro, but which at the time could not be identified as such.

Q: Was there Community dissent about the Brigade issue in 1978?

A: No, there was not; at least none was expressed during interagency consultations that led to publication of the August 1978 PDB and NID articles. The Soviet ground presence question had not really become a significant issue in the Community at that date.

Q: Did Brzezinski order you to assess the size, location, capability and purposes of Soviet ground force in Cuba in March 1979?

A: In April 1979 we were asked to prepare an analysis of Soviet-Cuban military relations in general, including, among seven other specific tasks, provision of all available information on Soviet military equipment, facilities, and capabilities in Cuba. There was no specific attention drawn to Soviet ground forces but in preparing drafts of our study, analysts attention was directed by me to analysis of fragmentary material on Soviet training.

Q: Is it true that by mid-June 1979 there was a "fierce dispute" in the Intelligence Community about the Brigade?

A: While there were differences of interpretation both within and among agencies, the only issue on which there was a proposed dissent had to do with the mission of the Soviet unit. This occurred in preparing the 19 July IIM. We have no specific evidence relating to mission and we included a range of possibilities that the Community believed were plausible and compatible with the evidence available. The Army rep wished to add that the unit could also be used to insure appropriate security should the Soviets at some future time decide to introduce nuclear weapons into Cuba. All other analysts from other agencies believed this was entirely without foundation and after I brought it to the attention of General Thompson it was withdrawn.

Q: Did you or any of your subordinates soft-pedal the Brigade issue because of SALT ratification?

A: Absolutely not. In fact, you will note the Soviets have accused CIA of concocting the Brigade intelligence in order to sabotage SALT.